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‘Bright chaps for hush-hush jobs’: masculinity, class and civilians in  
uniform at Bletchley Park 
Christopher Smith 
 
Bletchley Park, the headquarters of Britain’s cryptanalysis bureau during the Second 
World War, has become an increasingly significant landmark in the British cultural memory of 
the war. Senior Bletchley figures have been the subject of biographies, newspaper coverage, 
popular histories, television documentaries and, in the case of the now famous Alan Turing, 
even major motion pictures. The result is that the image typically presented of the agency is 
highly particular; an institution characterised by eccentric geniuses, who muddled their way to 
victory: the 2014 film, The Imitation Game, being a prime example.1 As Christopher Moran 
notes, the establishment’s ‘gifted practitioners have become a shorthand term for community, 
triumph over adversity, even the idea of Britishness itself.’2 Indeed, this was a view shared by 
intelligence officials themselves.3 The art of cipher cracking was regarded as an intellectual 
puzzle that required a lateral approach. In popular renditions of the Bletchley Park story, the 
best cryptanalysts and analysts were scholars, prominently specialists in languages and 
mathematics, crossword experts, chess players and others with trained minds, and principally 
male.  
As both popular and academic historians have shown, this is a misleading narrative. 
First, Bletchley Park was merely the headquarters and largest of several stations and offices of 
the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). The focus on Bletchley Park alone has 
been a distorting factor which has side-lined the contributions of those agency workers 
employed in satellite stations and partner organisations – not least the Y Service, which was 
tasked with intercepting and triangulating the origins of wireless traffic. Second, GC&CS 
employed over 10,000 individuals by December 1944, approximately three quarters of whom 
were women and the experiences of female staff have increasingly attracted scholarly interest 
in recent years.4 Third, historians, particularly of science and technology, have persuasively 
challenged the idea that the agency succeeded because of the efforts of a few key intellectual 
figures. Instead they have pointed towards the development of managerial and industrial 
processes in cryptanalysis and information management in building GC&CS’s success.5  
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Significant though all of these contributions have been in building a more complete 
understanding of this vitally important wartime intelligence enterprise, little attention has been 
given to the processes which led to the emergence of the popular, and indeed internal wartime, 
view that Bletchley Park succeeded because of the efforts of a corps of ingenious eccentrics. 
This was because those individuals engaged at the sharp end of wartime cryptanalysis and 
intelligence analysis were convinced that brains trumped a sophisticated grounding in the 
nuances of practical military matters. As the eminent historian and wartime intelligence officer 
(later Sir) F. Harry Hinsley noted, while summarising the skills required in the production of 
naval intelligence, ‘an academic exercise which, like the elucidation of a Latin text or the 
wrestling of deductions from the Doomsday Book, called more for an immersion in detail than 
for experience at sea.’6 In order to understand the basis for this view, qualified though it has 
been by historians such as Jon Agar,7 it is necessary to turn to the wider cultural influences, 
particularly that of dominant wartime ideals of masculinity and those of Britain’s intelligence 
community, on the development of the agency’s internal wartime culture. This culture, as the 
chapter will argue, was heavily coloured by internal notions of masculinity and the ideal man 
for the job of intelligence work.  
From its origins in the First World War, GC&CS developed its own peculiar hierarchy 
of masculinity which did indeed highlight many of the features which have so captured the 
popular imagination – which was both derived from wider British understandings of masculine 
behaviour yet apart from it. Masculinity in wartime Britain, as Sonya Rose has argued, 
emphasised heroic military manliness, though tempered in opposition to the brutal aspects of 
Nazi masculinity.8 Specifically middle-class configurations of manliness were built around 
ideas of patriotism, service and gentlemanly chivalry, but not necessarily intellectualism. The 
ideal man at Bletchley, however, was rather different. He was, first and foremost, a gentleman 
scholar to whom traditional notions of formal rank were only peripherally important. Wartime 
military masculinity, with its reverence of uniform, drill and violent displays of masculinity 
were also subordinated, despite a wartime influx of regular military personnel into the agency.   
Importantly, some of Bletchley’s men were, for administrative ease or as a result of 
recruitment strategies, nominally members of the armed forces. However, the distinction 
between civilian and service personnel is both complex and misleading. Most of those men in 
uniform were not career military men, but ‘civilians in uniform’, rarely expected to conform to 
military etiquette – something the organisation itself was reluctant to enforce. Notwithstanding 
their presence at Bletchley Park as uniformed personnel, the internal culture of GC&CS, 
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despite its military function, was hybrid; part military and part civilian. The tropes of 
masculinity, associated with servicemen in wider British wartime culture, rarely applied to 
these individuals in full – many of whom were distinctly intellectual and thoroughly middle 
class.  
This chapter will primarily draw upon GC&CS’s administrative records and veteran 
accounts to cast light on the variety of work, wartime experiences and the construction of 
masculinities within this highly unusual institution. First it will explore the development of the 
professional British intelligence community from the late Victorian and Edwardian periods and 
consider how the agency, founded in 1919, located itself in this world. Second, it will explore 
recruitment processes and the type of man (and occasionally woman) it sought for its most 
celebrated roles – cryptanalysts who broke ciphers, and linguists who translated and analysed 
intelligence. Third, it will explore challenges to these notions, as wartime pressures forced 
increased diversity in recruitment strategies and policies, which brought in a wider variety of 
men and women into this secret world to perform a range of different roles. That said, as a 
result of limited interest from historians and relatively sparse archival evidence related to those 
workers occupying lower grade positions, the central subjects of this chapter are those men 
recruited as cryptanalysts and intelligence officers. Ultimately, the chapter shows that Bletchley 
Park occupied a liminal space between overt forms of military service and civilian 
contributions to the war effort on the Home Front and that this facilitated the development of 
an internal hegemonic masculinity unique to the organisation. 
 
‘These men knew the type required’: masculinity and espionage, 1909-1939 
GC&CS was formed on 1 November 1919, the third and final of Britain’s major intelligence 
agencies. The other two, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, better known as MI6) and the 
Security Service (also known as MI5), had been founded a decade earlier in 1909. It was in this 
ten-year period that British intelligence efforts were centralised, institutionalised and 
professionalised.  
Late Victorian and Edwardian notions of masculine virtue, particularly as they pertained 
to the gentlemanly classes, formed the ideal for early recruitment of agents and intelligence 
officers. Such an individual, among other characteristics, was well bred, socially connected, 
patriotic, militaristic and a proficient sportsman. He was also an amateur and dilettante, distinct 
from the working and lower middle-class professional, capable of skilfully turning his hand 
towards a wide range of interests and pursuits.9 By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
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British intelligence community was built around highly developed social networks which, as 
John Fisher notes, were bound together by social class, family ties, education and, on occasion, 
military service.10 Espionage was not seen as a vocation conducted by professionals, but a form 
of dangerous service which the right sort of patriotic gentleman simply adopted. As the British 
agent George Alexander Hill noted in his memoirs, ‘A spy carries his life in his hands. His 
existence is one of hazard, joyous or the contrary. Spies in the British service have commonly 
taken up their dangerous duty out of sheer love of adventure.’11 Moreover, it was a privileged 
upbringing which provided the best preparation and Hill was dismissive of formal professional 
instruction. He noted that ‘If I had gone to a special school for years, studied espionage as a 
profession, I could not have had a better training than life gave me in my early days.’12 This 
was not entirely snobbery and his upbringing certainly came in handy – Hill had been educated 
by French and German governesses and, as a result, had a mastery of a variety of languages 
from an early age.13  
Unsurprisingly then, from the outset, MI5 and MI6, formed together as the Secret 
Service Bureau in 1909, had a particular type of man in mind when it came to recruitment. An 
agent required a stiff upper lip; he needed to be calm in the face of danger and crisis; he needed 
to be socially well connected; though intelligence and academic achievement were certainly 
not frowned upon, ability on the playing field was important; military or police experience was 
prized; and he needed to be a gentleman. These were traits which showed remarkable 
continuity and endured for years. As John Cairncross, a veteran of two British intelligence 
services (and also a Soviet mole) in the 1940s noted, in a letter to the novelist Graham Greene 
in 1991, ‘[t]he MI5 outfit has always struck me as an upper class specifically English outfit.’14 
When GC&CS was formed in 1919, it shared significant cultural DNA with the wider 
intelligence community and many of the same idealised masculine traits were equally prized by 
the new institution. By 1939 with around three quarters of scholarships awarded to public 
school products, Oxford and Cambridge were still unquestionably the most socially exclusive 
of Britain’s universities, and they constituted the primary source of the agency’s recruitment.15 
GC&CS’s association with Cambridge dated from the First World War. Prior to the formation 
of the organisation, Britain’s military cryptanalytic work had been performed by bureaus in the 
Admiralty (Room 40) and the War Office (MI1b). Significantly, Room 40 was founded by the 
scientist Sir James Alfred Ewing. Ewing had been appointed Professor of Mechanics and 
Applied Mathematics at Cambridge in 1890 where he remained until taking up his Admiralty 
post in 1903. When the First World War required the rapid construction of a first-rate 
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cryptanalytic service, Ewing utilised his contacts at Cambridge to find bright young men with 
an aptitude for languages.16  
GC&CS’s central mission, according to its first head, Commander Alastair Denniston 
writing in 1944, was twofold. First, it was overtly tasked with ensuring the security of the 
communications traffic of the British state. The second and covert responsibility was to 
intercept and analyse the traffic of foreign powers.17 The rise of the Soviet Union ensured that 
the activities of the Kremlin were at the forefront of the cryptanalysts’ attentions.18 Meanwhile, 
the fall of Germany from great power status, the sense of complacency this security brought 
with it, and the economic turmoil of the inter-war period, ensured that GC&CS was initially 
awarded only limited funds and resources and suffered during wider government retrenchment 
in 1921.19 The result was a small team, with relatively few new arrivals until the late 1930s. By 
that time it had became increasingly clear that under Adolf Hitler, Germany was resurgent, 
militarily aggressive and posed a clear threat to British interests. As such, Britain’s 
cryptanalysis service was founded with only 53 employees, half of whom were women 
employed in clerical and secretarial roles, and even after a substantial recruitment drive in the 
run-up to the Second World War, the agency still only began the conflict with approximately 
200 staff members.20 
The core of the workforce, the upper echelons in particular, were individuals who had 
been involved in cryptanalysis and intelligence since the First World War. As such, their work 
in cryptanalysis predated GC&CS itself. These were individuals like Commander Alastair 
Denniston, the head of the organisation, who had latterly been the chief of the Admiralty’s 
cryptanalytic section during the First World War. Senior members of his team included his 
deputy, a career Naval officer called Commander Edward Travis, his senior cryptanalyst and 
noted Cambridge classicist Dillwyn Knox, and chief administrator Nigel de Grey (who cracked 
the infamous 1917 Zimmerman telegram.21) These three men were veterans of Room 40 during 
the First World War and proven cryptanalysts. Similarly, senior figures, who had served in 
MI1b, such as John Tiltman, had come to occupy high-ranking positions within the new 
intelligence institution and remained in place until the Second World War.22 Some of their 
colleagues from the Great War had, however, returned to their lives in academia where they 
were able to act as talent spotters in the event of another war. ‘These men’, according to 
Denniston, ‘knew the type required.’23  
This channel of recruitment became the standard during the inter-war period and select 
university officials were asked to draw up short, exclusive lists of the right ‘type’ of ‘man’, 
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who might be willing to serve his country. In 1932 Denniston contacted Mr C. E. D. Peters of 
Oxford University, asking him to look out for potential recruits, and added, ‘In the last war you 
may remember that 40 O[ld]. B[uilding]. was the Admiralty Cryptographic Bureau and this 
Bureau was recruited almost entirely from the Universities.’24 In 1935, as tensions between 
Italy and Britain were growing over the question of Abyssinia, Denniston wrote to Peters once 
again. 
 
In the past years you have been of very great assistance to us in producing 
candidates for our unusual work. Therefore I am writing to tell you that in 
the event of Anglo-Italian relations becoming somewhat strained I might 
have to apply to you to obtain trustworthy men with a thorough knowledge 
of Italian for translation and intelligence work.25 
 
A few days later, Denniston followed up his letter with a further note, stating: ‘During the war 
of 1914-18 a good many dons in residence who thought they could be spared did offer for this 
type of work’.26 
By 1938 this system had further evolved and taster training courses were delivered at 
Oxbridge colleges. The graduates of those courses acted, once they had been accepted into the 
organisation, as further conduits for recruitment of academics and students.27 One of the most 
successful of these recruits-turned-recruiter was Gordon Welchman. A mathematician at Sidney 
Sussex, Cambridge, Welchman began earmarking his own students, several of whom, including 
the famous cryptanalysts Joan Clarke and John Herivel, would eventually join him at Bletchley 
Park.28 The result of all of this was that cryptanalysis, translation and interpretation duties was 
primarily conducted by bright young men (and a few women), drawn from Britain’s elite 
universities.  
Graduates from other universities do not appear to have been much considered at all 
during the inter-war years; certainly correspondence between Denniston and the universities 
was primarily limited to Oxford and Cambridge throughout the 1930s.29 On occasion, 
Denniston did write to contacts at the University of London. However, as he confided to a 
Foreign Office colleague in 1938, he was reluctant to ‘inform London University of the 
vacancies as it is always difficult to get in touch with them for these positions of a delicate 
nature, and at the last interview they supplied three or four candidates whose qualifications 
were quite unsatisfactory.’30 Similarly, in the same letter, Denniston made it clear that female 
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candidates were, by and large, to be avoided. He had not contacted the women’s Oxbridge 
colleges for one post because GC&CS already had a good internal female candidate – one 
female applicant was evidently more than sufficient. 
So, besides being well-educated, what type of man were the recruiters looking for? 
First, he was required to be bright. The preferred candidates not only had to be Oxbridge 
graduates, but particular emphasis was placed on attracting those with First-class degrees – 
considered a guarantor of sufficient powers of intellect. Although GC&CS was increasingly 
turning towards mathematics, the precise academic expertise mattered less and it continued to 
place a great deal of stock in the tried and tested belief that the literary disciplines produced 
quality officers. As Denniston would note, ‘an individual with a taste for modern languages 
would be a suitable man for us. It is true that a man with a mathematical mind is probably the 
most suitable, but we have several distinguished classicists who are among our most able 
members.’31 Second, the man had to be both young and of strong character. Individuals prone 
to ‘nerve weakness’, men who lacked the quintessential British ‘stiff upper lip’ of popular 
imagination, were disqualified from consideration.32 Similarly, older men were also out of the 
running; one applicant in 1937, aged 33, was deemed ‘too old’.33 Though experience showed 
that young men were deemed more likely to crack under the strain of the work, older 
individuals were thought more problematic. They were deemed to be too rigid and 
insufficiently capable of learning the new skills required for the role.34 Third, as noted above, 
connections and a nod from an individual already inside the growing network of contacts, 
either as a trusted recruiter or practitioner, was important. In addition to ensuring that 
candidates were of sufficient aptitude, recruitment based on elite education was also a 
mechanism to acquiring ‘trustworthy men’.35 Possession of the ‘right’ school and university tie 
was an indicator that the recipient had been inculcated in gentlemanly values and, as a result, 
was worthy of trust. 
 
‘Not being at the front was somehow dishonourable’: hegemonic masculinity and wartime 
Bletchley Park 
These practices developed over the course of GC&CS’s history and continued into the Second 
World War. When describing the precise nature of the wartime recruitment process, Peter 
Calvocoressi, a senior Bletchley Park officer and later respected jurist, historian and publisher, 
revealed in 1980 that the institution was heavily informed by upper-middle-class cultural 
practices, environments, and attitudes towards social class. Recruiters ‘made forays into 
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[public] schools and colleges, boardrooms and clubs. They put questions that were veiled and 
yet understood. They could not say precisely what they were looking for, but between friends 
and over a glass of sherry enough would be conveyed: bright chaps for hush-hush jobs.’ Of 
course, at least initially, the ‘old-girls’ network was less prized.36 Calvocoressi, like the 
recruiters, reflected the belief that self-discipline, public service, and duty were all instilled into 
members of the upper-middle-classes through education and upbringing.37 Members of that 
world could surely be trusted. Indeed, even in 1980, Calvocoressi still argued that it was this 
class factor which ensured the maintenance of the secrecy surrounding Bletchley Park until 
1974.38 A similar attitude was taken when it came to the appointment of some managers, when, 
on occasion, the academics occupying such positions proved unequal to the task. In such 
instances, GC&CS turned to the world of business. For instance, Sir Eric Jones, who would 
become the Director General of the Government Communications Headquarters (Britain’s 
post-war cryptanalysis organisation) from 1952 to 1960, had been an executive at a textile 
factory before the war. Following a period of service in the Air Ministry, he was appointed into 
a middle management role at Bletchley Park precisely because of his abilities as a manager.39 
Though there were vastly increased demands for well-educated young men in wartime, 
(such men were sought after by a whole host of agencies, industries and military services, not 
least the other intelligence agencies), GC&CS’s recruit policies for cryptanalysts and 
translators remained largely unchanged. When trawling for three Temporary Senior Assistants, 
a senior civil service rank remunerated with a generous £600 per annum, to translate Italian 
decrypts, a set of specific qualifications were outlined. Applicants required ‘First-class Italian 
and first-class intelligence. Candidates are required for positions of responsibility and for work 
which requires leadership, accuracy and speed.’ No doubt given the seniority of the position 
and the required leadership element, the recruiters were instructed to look for ‘men (if 
possible)’, but only those aged between 25 and 40; the young remained favoured.40  
Clearly then, certain assumptions surrounding the characteristics which made a good 
cryptanalyst and intelligence officer had become ingrained. Moreover, they had crystallised 
into a specific hegemonic masculinity, unique to Bletchley Park. The ideal young man was a 
patriotic gentleman, trustworthy, from a ‘good’ family, well educated, and, above all, very 
bright. Those individuals who did not fit this mould were viewed as a potential liability, not 
just to the success of the work, but to themselves. One veteran, Paul Fetterlein, in an interview 
with Lindsay Baker for the Imperial War Museum, recalled rumours of individuals, unable to 
cope with the strain of the work, taking their own lives. 
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People took it very, very seriously and I know in the newspapers today they 
say all about the great successes people had and so on and how important 
that was. But they don’t mention those who were failures at it, and there 
were some people who took it very badly. In fact there were two or three 
suicides; people who tried to do a code and, you know, and you sort of work 
week, after week, after week and nothing happened, it can be very 
depressing. And as I said, there were some people who couldn’t take it and 
committed suicide. […] They felt that they had failed England in its hour of 
need.41 
 
Interestingly, Fetterlein was explicit in noting that he had never actually known any such 
individual personally and nor were such matters discussed at Bletchley Park itself. Instead, the 
rumours circulated in various fashionable London intellectual circles frequented by Bletchley 
Park’s staff during their time off.  
 While dominant middle-class masculinity of Bletchley Park revolved around scholarly 
gentlemanliness, wider British hegemonic masculinity placed greater importance and emphasis 
on other masculine traits. Masculinity was increasingly associated with military service and the 
soldier hero. Those men out of uniform were, according to Sonya Rose, forced to identify and 
stress the ‘heroic features of their masculinity’ in other ways and ‘drew upon both a language of 
military battle and a language of working-class manhood’.42 From GC&CS’s point of view, this 
created some problems when it came to recruitment. If the performative aspects of wartime 
British masculinity privileged military heroism, then a government desk job, with little explicit 
relevance to the war effort clearly could lack appeal. To get around the problem of unwilling, 
but well qualified, potential recruits, recruitment officials in the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service were instructed to compel candidates of high quality to attend interviews 
‘under Defence Regulation 80b if necessary’. Moreover, recruiters were further instructed that 
‘no submission should be withheld because a candidate does not wish to be considered, 
provided the qualifications are suitable.’43  
 Another unfortunate side effect was that a number of men found that their masculinity 
and manliness were open to public question and they, in turn, were subjected to humiliation. 
These kinds of public shaming of men who did not conform to the characteristics of hegemonic 
masculinity on display in wartime Britain were, in some respects, reminiscent of the campaigns 
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launched against civilian men during the First World War, though difficult to quantify in terms 
of scale.44 More recent research based on oral history testimony has, however, suggested that 
rather than enduring external pressure from within their communities to join the armed 
services, British men on the Home Front during the Second World War were more likely to 
subject themselves to internalised pressures. This manifested itself in the form of feelings of 
inadequacy that such men placed on themselves because they felt that they should be doing 
‘more’ to fight for King and Country.45 One solution for such men, who were prevented from 
entering military service, was to at least create the appearance of military service and to join 
the Home Guard. Complete with a near identical uniform to that of regular Army personnel 
(the identifying signifier of Home Guard status being easily removed and reattached as 
required46), civilian men were able to demonstrate what Connell and Messerschmidt describe 
as ‘complicit masculinity’.47 That is, they enjoyed the ‘benefits of patriarchy without enacting a 
strong version of masculine dominance’, which in wartime Britain emphasised active military 
service. For the middle-class, academically-minded cryptanalysts and codebreakers of 
Bletchley Park, this was difficult if not impossible to achieve. Many of them, despite being of 
military age, were not in uniform and though they were engaged in work of clear national 
importance to the war effort, it was secret in nature. Even though alternative options, such as 
the Home Guard were available,48 for some they were not enough. The language and mediums 
for expressing military masculinity, in describing their work to friends and family outside of 
work circles, was unavailable.  
At Bletchley Park, some men faced overt external pressure to leave the relative safety 
of the Home Front while others subjected themselves to internal pressure. In terms of the 
former, Gordon Welchman, the head of a major Bletchley Park section, recounted in his 
memoir, a case in which a young man under his command ‘received a scathing letter from his 
old headmaster accusing him of being a disgrace to his school.’ Yet as as Welchman explained, 
internal and external pressures went hand in hand: there was an ‘inevitable feeling that not 
being at the front was somehow dishonourable’. Despite their ‘exhausting’ and vital job, young 
men at Bletchley Park ‘longed to play an active part in the fighting.’49 Such individuals, not 
only had to face their own sense of unease, but also had to contend with the local community 
where their presence had not gone unnoticed. One local resident, in a published collection of 
oral history interview excerpts, remembered pondering whether the new arrivals to the town 
were ‘skiving’.50 Bletchley staff were also clearly and acutely aware of local suspicion, as was 
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recorded in a poem entitled Bumph Palace, ‘For six long years we have been there / subject to 
local scorn and stare.’51 
In a notable example, Donald Michie, a veteran and later a pioneering figure in the field 
of artificial intelligence, recalled his own excruciating humiliation in a briefing filled with 
young women of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) in which he sat ‘like an ugly 
duckling’. The WAAFs, he recalled, ‘felt only contempt for an apparently young male in 
civilian attire. Some of them had lost boyfriends in the RAF, and many had boyfriends still 
alive but in daily peril.’52 The painful experience, which he described as a ‘white feather’ 
incident, but also appears to be in equal part the internal pressure of imagining what the 
WAAFs were thinking about him, clearly played on his mind and, some time later, those 
feelings of inadequacy were externally reinforced by his father. Naturally, Michie had been 
unable to inform his family what he was doing and all they knew was that he was involved in 
nondescript war work. So, when, at the St George’s Golf Club, his father had been asked how 
his son was contributing to the war effort ‘his mind was unavoidably blank’ and, in turn, asked 
Michie whether he had ‘considered active service’. Having been humiliated twice, first by a 
group of young women and then by his father, Michie asked for a transfer to the North African 
desert, for which his superior (Colonel Pritchard) gave him a dressing down. 
 
‘I have to instruct you to return to duty. You see, Mr Michie, we have a war 
on our hands. Inconvenient, but unfortunately true. Unless you have further 
questions, you are free to return at once to your section.’ Pause. ‘And by the 
way, I do not expect you to raise such matters again.’ Pause. ‘Either with me 
or with anyone else.’  Longer pause. ‘As for your father, I do not anticipate 
that he will raise them either.’ 
 
On that matter, it transpired that Pritchard was right, as Michie learned years later: his hitherto 
disappointed father was ‘paid a visit’ by a military official.53 The issue of security was, 
understandably, key. Not only were the men of Bletchley Park, as Pritchard noted, in many 
cases making their best possible contribution to the war effort, but even if it were desirable for 
them to change role to one of active military service, that was impossible.54 In many cases, they 
simply knew too much and their risk of capture by the enemy was too great. They were stuck at 
Bletchley whether they liked it or not.  
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‘Galling to regulars’: competing masculinities 
One area in which the general labour shortage provoked by the Second World War did force 
change in GC&CS’s recruitment practices, which had in other respects been remarkably 
resilient, was its approach to university recruitment. While a primacy continued to be placed on 
Oxbridge, Nigel de Grey noted sadly that ‘As national recruiting became more methodical this 
system tended to clash with the proper authorities. There were also diminishing returns as men 
and women joined the Services.’ The net had to be widened once national recruitment policies 
became more ‘methodical’.55 Though de Grey was not specific on the precise timing of this 
change, it is a reasonable assumption that he was alluding to the further extension of 
conscription under the National Service Act (No 2) in December 1941. As a result, recruiters 
began trawling other universities, the armed forces and the civil service for suitable talent.56 
This, however, came with it its own problems as new arrivals brought challenge to the 
dominant image of masculinity within the agency – particularly regular service personnel.  
Though GC&CS had been formed around men who had served in the First World War, 
many of them as military officers, during the inter-war period and the organisation’s 
mobilisation during the late 1930s, it had become decidedly civilian in character. As de Grey 
noted in 1949, ‘Direct contact with Universities, secondary schools, etc. In general this method 
produced not only the original 60 high-grade people but also considerable numbers 
afterwards.’57 Yet, by June 1942, some 37% of GC&CS’s personnel were in military uniform, a 
figure which would continue to rise over the course of the war.58 The gender composition also 
radically changed as women were increasingly employed to conduct auxiliary functions, 
typically in machine operation and clerical work.59 However, very few of these (eventually 
thousands of) women were employed in cryptanalysis and translation – those were, of course, 
the ‘men’s jobs’. Instead, they were typically placed into these forms of auxiliary ‘women's 
work’. In this respect, Bletchley Park clearly conformed to Peggy Inman's observation (and 
that of many others since) that comparatively few women were allowed to undertake ‘male’ 
jobs, despite popular notions to the contrary.60 In GC&CS, the far greater challenge to gender 
and the dominant internal configuration of masculinity came from the arrival of other men. 
The influx of military personnel first created tensions, particularly surrounding the 
question of pay. The nub of the problem was that civil servants were largely less well 
remunerated than their counterparts in the military services. The result was that men 
conducting identical work could receive radically different pay. In addition, it was also 
frustrating for regular officers, who had earned their rank and pay, that temporary officers, 
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individuals parachuted into uniform and into a relatively high rank, were equally well 
remunerated.61 The issue of equal pay for equal work continued to plague senior managers 
throughout the war and was never satisfactorily resolved.62  
Besides creating administrative problems, the increasingly military character of the 
agency brought with it cultural conflicts which revolved around the introduction of new, 
competing masculine ideals, to Bletchley Park. One of the central features of the organisation 
was that, despite being quasi-military since its conception, it did not for the most part observe 
military traditions. This issue, which included limited adherence to uniform etiquette, came to a 
head when an Admiral visited Bletchley and, unable to spot any members of the Women’s 
Royal Naval Service, returned to London thoroughly disgruntled by the lack of discipline on 
display.63 This issue of uniform, in the literal sense, also arose in other areas of business, not 
least mess arrangements. At the outset of the war, it had been usual for GC&CS’s military 
officers to wear their uniforms as and when they pleased and for enlisted men in the ranks to 
wear them perpetually.64 Indeed, the donning of uniform by military officers had been actively 
discouraged because, as noted above, they did the same work as civilians and it was assumed 
that the construction of artificial differences might result in friction. When a new cafeteria open 
to all ranks was proposed, the issue of officers being able to eschew uniform, as agency 
tradition had determined, came to a head. While those in the ranks would be expected to wear 
their uniforms, officers would not, which provoked ‘grounds for resentment’. Ultimately it was 
proposed that ‘it would be good policy’ to ensure that military personnel wear their uniform 
‘the whole time’. The basis for that recommendation was: 
 
It has been stated on many occasions that discipline is not very ridged here, 
particularly among the Service personnel. I think that is a perfectly correct 
statement, but we have some odd officers here to say the least of it, many of 
whom do not behave as officers and therefore cannot fairly expect to be 
treated as such.65 
 
Of course, given that GC&CS emerged from the Admiralty and War Office and had strong 
connections to each of the Whitehall military service ministries, men in uniform had always 
been present. However, wartime mobilisation and conscription also ensured that, at times, it 
was preferable for bureaucratic purposes to formally place an individual into uniform only to 
immediately then second them to GC&CS.66 One problem was that enlisted men were also 
14 
 
recruited into cryptanalysis and translation work, making the differences in formal seniority 
and pay particularly acute. The solution was extraordinarily rapid promotion. Asa Briggs,67 for 
example, who joined the army directly from Cambridge University in 1941 as a private soldier 
and seconded to GC&CS in 1942, was swiftly promoted to the rank of Regimental Sergeant 
Major – a member of the highest group of non-commissioned officers. In 1945, after he had 
left Bletchley Park, he described himself being treated as a ‘real RSM’, highlighting the 
significant distinction between what the rank meant at Bletchley and its very considerable 
importance in the regular armed forces.68  
As the example of the visiting Admiral demonstrates, the acquisition of regular military 
men, who held very different ideas regarding how officers and enlisted men and women should 
behave to that of the civilians and soldiers in uniform, created tensions. As de Grey explained 
in 1949, the ‘very low standard of “military” behaviour in a civil institution [was] galling to 
regulars.’69 The most pronounced examples of this occurred not within the walls of Bletchley 
Park itself, but rather just outside them. The rapid expansion of the agency, which numbered 
around 8,000 at Bletchley Park alone by December 1944, ensured that local billets had swiftly 
been exhausted. The response to this problem had been the construction of two purpose-build 
military accommodation camps on the immediate outskirts of the facility. These were operated 
by the Army and RAF respectively, staffed by regular military personnel uninitiated into the 
secret work conducted within the walls of the Park, and run under closely observed military 
rules and rituals.  
This clash between the ill-disciplined behaviour of the civilians in uniform who worked 
for GC&CS and what Paul Fussell memorably described as military ‘chickenshit’ (‘behavior 
that makes military life worse than it need be: petty harassment of the weak by the strong; open 
scrimmage for power and authority and prestige; sadism thinly disguised as necessary 
discipline; a constant “paying off of old scores”; and insistence on the letter rather than the 
spirit of the ordinances’) was pronounced. To make matters worse, among the key victims of 
‘chickenshit’ were ‘the artist, the “so-called intellectual,” the sneerer at athletics, the “smart 
ass”, the “stuck up,” the foreigner – anyone conceived to be “not our crowd.”’70 Certainly, the 
arrival of regular military discipline soon saw Bletchley staff confronted with ‘chickenshit’. In 
his memoir, James Thirsk, another non-commissioned officer at Bletchley Park, presented the 
army camp commander, Colonel Fillingham, as a ‘formidable’ and ‘awe-inspiring’ figure. 
Fillingham is reported to have delighted in berating his ill-disciplined troops for various minor 
infractions and introduced the dreaded ‘PT’ [Physical Training].71 Similarly, Asa Briggs fell 
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foul of a camp Lieutenant because of a failure to correctly fold the blankets on his bedding. 
The Lieutenant might have later come to regret his military pedantry when he later applied to 
Briggs’ Oxford College.72  
 There were, of course, many hundreds of other men working for GC&CS whose work 
and contribution to the success of the vast cryptanalytic exercise have, by and large, left little 
archival trace. Such individuals represent yet another strand of masculinity within the agency, 
typically drawn from the lower strata of Britain’s social class system. These were the 
mechanics, security staff, gardeners, clerks, technicians and so on. For instance, the fabled 
machines constructed to aid the deciphering of Axis messages, to collate collected intelligence 
and communications equipment designed to transport this product to government ministries 
and across the world to distant military commands, were primarily maintained by men – 
typically non-commissioned officers from the armed forces.  
 In all, there were just under 250 such mechanics employed by the agency by September 
1944.73 Yet the archives provide little detail regarding the selection process for these men or the 
kinds of recruit they acquired. The most obvious conclusion to draw from this is that they were 
simply seconded. Certainly, this was the case when it came to the approximately 4,000 women 
from the armed forces stationed at Bletchley and its satellite (usually termed ‘out stations’) 
facilities. Many of these women were assigned to work at Bletchley Park because, following 
their basic training, they declared themselves willing to work on ‘special duties’. The process 
for men, particularly those performing technical work, was rather different.  
 The clearest account of the selection procedure, by the former RAF electrical engineer 
Ken McConnell, asserts that the process was far from simple. McConnell had been trained 
before the war as an electrical engineer, which was classified a reserved occupation, precluding 
him from conscription. However, following the Dunkirk evacuation, he was permitted to 
volunteer for the RAF and, having been accepted, he spent two years plying his trade on 
aircraft. He was then selected to perform secret work and sat an arduous exam.74 In a short 
account submitted to the BBC People’s War archive, Denis Whelan recalled that most of the 
crews which maintained specialised cryptanalytic machines were made up of men from the 
Royal Engineers. As a civil service telephone engineer seconded to the Foreign Office, 
Whelan’s job was to build devices to test those cryptanalytic machines. However, because the 
machines were temperamental, he and a colleague were assigned as on-call engineers regularly 
visiting Bletchley Park and its various out stations testing machine faults. Whelan made little 
reference to his passage into secret work, but did recall that it involved an interview.75 Finally, 
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Mr H. L. Swatton, another General Post Office engineer, before being transferred to Bletchley 
Park, was not only interviewed but subjected to a hands-on test of his technical skill with a 
variety of equipment.76  
Even from these few examples, it is clear that the men in the ‘lower’ orders of the 
organisation were typically highly skilled in their technical fields, but that their route to 
Bletchley Park involved a fairly rigorous interviewing process which, in some cases even 
involved a practical element. The fairly easy passage into secret work, which, in the case of at 
least some cryptanalysts, involved a sounding out over drinks, did not apply to lower graded 
male staff. Of course, they did not mix in the same circles, they did not possess the appropriate 
school tie and had not attended the ‘right’ university – they were not ‘gentlemen’.  
 
Conclusion 
Over the course of its existence GC&CS developed a unique, internal configuration of 
masculinity which drew from a variety of sources. These included wider British middle and 
aristocratic gentlemanly society, the common-room culture imported from Britain’s universities 
and the archetype of the gentleman spy from the wider intelligence community. In particular, 
the war saw the development of a distinct type of employee; the soldier in uniform, as 
individuals from a civilian and often scholarly background were placed into military attire for 
the duration of the conflict. Over time, however, the men stationed at Bletchley Park, in high 
status, intellectually-demanding roles such as cryptanalysis and translation, were supplemented 
by men sourced from the regular armed forces. The majority of these men, particularly those 
out of military uniform, were clearly distinct from, and were expected to conform to, a 
different template of masculinity to those outlined by historians such as Sonya Rose in wider 
British society. Of course, these men were not appointed for their martial ability or trained for 
such a role. They were, however, required to have a distinctly middle class background 
complete with an elite education, most typically with university training. This not only ensured 
that candidates were of a high intellectual calibre – a necessity for many of the agency’s jobs – 
but also created the illusion that because they were ‘gentlemen’ their discretion and honour 
were beyond question. This exclusivity was, of course, not always possible particularly in the 
case of lower tier male staff: skilled ‘professionals’ like technicians were, instead, heavily 
vetted and subjected to intense interviews and tests prior to appointment.   
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GC&CS was not always, however, a melting pot of masculinity. Instead, competing 
ideas took root at different times and the influx of new groups of men disturbed any sense of 
equilibrium. For instance, the arrival of regular military personnel into a largely civilian 
organisation led to consternation from both the regulars disturbed by the lack of discipline and 
the decidedly unmilitary denizens of Bletchley Park suddenly faced with the prospect of 
uniforms, drill and PT. The fact that many of these individuals were out of uniform, or 
perceived to be engaged in outwardly unheroic work also presented problems as men, on 
occasion, felt and were perceived to be failing their masculine military duty at a time of war.  
Meanwhile, further down the hierarchical rungs, typically obscured in the archives and over-
shadowed in popular discourse regarding the establishment, were hundreds of men from 
different socio-economic backgrounds – the ‘professional’ class – and who travelled a 
markedly different route to arrive at Bletchley Park.  
In short, the masculine characteristics desired by GC&CS included those of the 
professor-turned-codebreaker and hard-headed intelligence professional. The ideal cryptanalyst 
and translator was an intellectual, but he was also cool-headed and in possession of a stiff-
upper-lip; he was a gentleman amateur but also willing to tolerate management in an 
increasingly professional environment. Popular emphasis on Turing-like caricatures understates 
the complex matrix of masculine characteristics prized by the agency and the variety of roles it 
required filling, but it does reflect how the institution viewed its staff and the qualities it 
valued. As one visiting intelligence officer, Ewen Montagu, recalled being told by a colleague 
at Bletchley Park, ‘an acrostic brain is better at this game.’77 
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